The Tunis Consensus is the fruit of the second regional (African) meeting on Aid Effectiveness, held in November 2010. Organised by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Development Bank, the meeting was intended to set out an African agenda to take to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, to be held in Busan, South Korea, in November/December 2011.

The Tunis Consensus sets out a clear vision of Africa’s development priorities, organised around six key elements:

1) Building capable states that can deliver development results

2) Developing democratic accountability on the basis of enhanced transparency and greater involvement of parliaments and citizens in decision-making

3) Promoting south-south cooperation and learning

4) Thinking and acting regionally in terms of infrastructure and investment

5) Embracing new development partners such as Brazil, China and India

6) Outgrowing aid dependence through greater trade and investment and building fair and efficient tax systems

The key point made by the Tunis Consensus – subtitled “from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness” is that “Aid is only one part of the solution to Africa’s development challenges”. As the Center for Global Development emphasised in a recent blog post, it is important that that message is heard and that African priorities are taken on board.

Nevertheless, aid remains an important part of the development landscape and making aid more effective remains essential. The key is to ensure that the wider picture of development effectiveness is not neglected. By focusing on transparency, accountability, country ownership and results – issues that provide a potential common ground for donors and recipients of aid – Busan can help to ensure that smart and effective aid supports African priorities and acts as a catalyst for development.

To inform the agenda on governance and aid effectiveness in the run up to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, the Belgian EU Presidency – in collaboration with ECDPM and the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Network on Governance (GOVNET) – organised a roundtable on Domestic Accountability and Aid Effectiveness as part of the European Development Days in December. The roundtable brought together experts from Ghana, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria, Ecuador and the OECD, giving a strong southern focus to discussion.

I had the task of producing a report from the meeting, bringing together some key messages about how donors can best support the strengthening of domestic accountability in developing countries. The report welcomes the fact that the aid effectiveness agenda is paying more attention to governance, but strikes a cautious note – urging donors to think carefully before they go full steam ahead, again, trying to use aid to shape governance in developing countries.

The full report is available here. The key messages are:

• Domestic accountability, legitimate governance and well-balanced state-society relations are crucial for good development outcomes.
• Donors make a difference to the workings of domestic accountability in developing countries, including through the ways in which they provide aid.
• Donors have a responsibility and an interest in ensuring that aid strengthens rather than undermines domestic accountability. To do this, donors should provide aid through country systems and help to build the capacity of key organisations such as parliaments, the media and civil society organisations to exercise effective accountability over the use of aid and domestically-generated resources.
• Domestic accountability is, however, driven primarily by domestic politics. This has implications for what donors can effectively do to support the strengthening of domestic accountability.
• Rather than encouraging the adoption of particular models of governance, donors should seek to nurture the environment of transparency and accountability out of which appropriate solutions to the challenges of development might emerge, led and owned by local stakeholders. 

Today sees the first mention of the report on the internet. Bloomberg reports that Merera Gudina, the Chairman of the opposition Oromo People’s Congress, is “not enthusiastic” about the report and “fed up of complaining to donors when they are consciously refusing to know and/or knowing the truth but they are refusing to face the reality.”

I am not in a position to state authoritatively what the reality is. However, a casual observer of development and politics in Ethiopia would quickly conclude that the perspectives and priorities of donors and the Ethiopian opposition in relation to that reality are somewhat different.

The former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, called the report a “careful, thorough and rather bureaucratic response” to “highly charged allegations.”

Full Bloomberg report is here. Donors’ report is here.

The report finally came out yesterday. It’s available here at the DAG website or, failing that, can be found here

I wish I were leaving in the aftermath of an election that had not only been relatively peaceful but which had also seen Ethiopia continue its path towards the deepened democracy that I think – as well as being important in its own terms – is important for the country’s long-term stability and sustainable progress on poverty reduction. Sadly, I am not. The next few years will be a challenge. Ethiopians will and should be at the forefront of meeting that challenge. But, with responsibilities shared in a global world, outsiders – struggling to know what to do for the best and juggling different priorities – must not turn their backs. Sadly, by flying home tonight, I am.

However, I will keep in touch and will – because accountability is central to politics and power/powerlessness – keep banging on about accountability and development. Much progress is needed, and is possible, both here in Ethiopia, in the UK and globally. And, I am sure that this won’t be my last time in Ethiopia. Thanks to everyone who has made my time here so rewarding and to Amanda who has had to put up with – and has been very supportive of – my decision to disappear for 7 months.

Owen Barder has an interesting post on this, setting out why he says little about Ethiopian politics. In brief, his view is that Ethiopians’ views rather than his should be listened to and that to give more weight to outsiders views is “unconsciously racist”, and that his time is more appropriately spent helping to fix the policies and practices of his own country’s government.

I agree with much of what Owen says in relation to this. First, the idea that citizens of developed countries have a particular responsibility to try to get their own governments to act in ways that are better in terms of development – to address issues that are, in Owen’s words, “properly mine to help fix”. Second, that the ability of outsiders (eg. me, with much worse Amharic than Owen!) to understand Ethiopian politics is limited and therefore our views should not be given very much weight. And I would add, outsiders should not be seeking to impose inappropriate context-insensitive normative models about how things should be.

However I do think that the phrase “properly mine to help fix” (or my “particular responsibility” phrase above) should be unpacked as states and sovereignty are socially and politically constructed. That is, they are not natural givens and one might argue in some instances, and to some extent, that other principles/norms – for instance in relation to human rights, or justice or accountability – trump that of sovereignty (as in the notion of the responsibility to protect, or the universal declaration of human rights).

I also wonder what Owen would make of statements on the electoral process put out by the EU Election Observation Mission or the UK Government. Are they unconsciously racist? Is reading them unconsciously racist? If a Government that provides aid to country X is concerned to ensure and to assure its own citizens that that aid is not supporting a repressive regime, is it reasonable – or unconsciously racist – of that Government to make an assessment of the political system in country X and the impact of aid on that political system (and of the the impact of that political system on the effectiveness of aid)?

And what of calls by groups within Ethiopia for outsiders to be more vocal in their criticisms? Are those calls unconsciously racist, even if those calls are made by Ethiopians who understand the politics very well?

It seems to me that that things are – and should be – more complicated than a simple “outsiders should shut up, should not be listened to, and should concentrate on problems that are properly theirs to fix”.

Globalisation after all does blur the borders between inside and outside. Should people from developing countries who are affected by UK policies on migration, or climate change, shut up too, or are they stakeholders with a legitimate interest/right in saying what they think and seeking cross-border accountability?

Globalisation goes beyond the borders. So too should and do concerns with rights, justice and accountabilities. The challenge is to find the appropriate balance between putting into practice that principle – of global social justice – and the principle of country-ownership/non-interference/not talking about stuff that is not ”properly yours” to talk about or fix.

Owen Barder has an interesting post about aid effectiveness which gives his take on why the Paris agenda is not working. He had been invited to participate in a retreat for the Development Assistance Group (26 donors) as they reflect on what they do and how they could do it better.

What struck me most about Owen’s presentation to the DAG was that his analysis of why Paris isn’t working is – other than two brief mentions of accountability – completely silent about the role of politics in aid effectiveness (and the role of aid in influencing supposedly domestic politics in developing countries). This might be because Owen is a self-described economist and I am not, but nevertheless it came as a bit of a surprise. Donor behaviour is certainly part of the problem and one which Owen’s ideas might go some way to address, but the reason why aid is not as effective as it might be is surely in large part because of the political contexts into which aid is pumped and the fact that donors’ behaviour is insufficiently informed by good understanding of those contexts.

Those of us from donor countries no doubt have more leverage – and, Owen might argue, more legitimacy – in seeking to influence the behaviour of their own governments/aid agencies, but if aid is to be made more effective then it needs to be provided in ways that are informed by a good understanding of the realities of governance and politics on the ground in the specific contexts where it is provided. This isn’t easy and presents its own dilemmas about where the line is between donors legitimately seeking to ensure that their actions are informed by a good understanding of the political landscape and interfering unhelpfully in that landscape, but it seems to me to be an essential complement to the sort of approach that Owen advocates. And, it is a perspective that is – post-Accra, with the notion of ownership more seriously interrogated and the importance of multiple accountabilities considered – at least beginning to influence the aid effectiveness agenda.

Sue Unsworth (drawing on her recent piece on “What’s politics got to do with it? Why donors find it so hard to come to terms with politics and why this matters”) and Mick Moore had an interesting piece on Open Democracy about this and about what they have been calling “an upside down view of governance” [I think it should be inside-out and upside-down - emphasising that one should look at different things as well as look at things differently].  David Booth too (my former colleague at ODI) draws on a similar analysis in his suggestions as to how the aid effectiveness agenda needs to be reformed.

Owen’s presentation had two other elements in it that provoked responses from me, responses that relate to my take on the failings of the aid effectiveness agenda.

First, the idea – Samuelson’s, not necessarily Owen’s – that the idea of comparative advantage is the only idea in the social sciences that is both true and non-trivial. Twaddle. I see your comparative advantage and raise it with the prisoners’ dilemma; the idea that two people might not cooperate even if it is in their best interests to do so. Put differently, the pursuit of individual interests can lead to socially sub-optimal outcomes. And, if prisoners’ dilemma doesn’t trump comparative advantage, I’ve got the tragedy of the commons up my sleeve too. True, and in a world of shared resources that don’t match up with property rights or sovereignties, certainly not trivial.

Second, the rhetorical question – posed in relation to donor division of labour exercises – about which donors want to leave the room/sector/country. I’m only a tiny bit of a donor, but I do and am. On Thursday. To be replaced by an Ethiopian who has a better understanding of the politics of Ethiopia than I will ever have. Not quite the room-leaving-manoeuvre that Owen would like, but in my view the sort of room-leaving-manoeuvre that is at least as important for making aid more effective.

I wonder whether the DAG’s reflection included consideration of the relationship between politics and aid effectiveness, and the need for donors to better understand the politics, or perhaps the political landscape for donors in Ethiopia is considered so problematic that this sort of discussion is best avoided?

Putting budget documents on-line and enhancing transparency about aid are great things to have done/be doing, and the work of AidInfo is very useful, but these sorts of initiatives do leave me pondering some questions or issues. As does Tim Berners-Lee’s motto of “Raw data now!” or AidInfo’s “Liberate the data”.

Anyway, three sets of issues:

1) To make sense of “raw data”, one needs a theory. I think that this sometimes gets forgotten as if one can just make sense of massive influxes of data, without some framework of/for understanding. A variant of this problem is when the theories that are shaping how “raw data” is selected, connected and interpreted are left unexamined as if they were value-neutral. At risk of straying into one of my gripes about mainstream economics, I’ll leave that one there …

2) To make the “raw data” or transparency deliver something useful – policy and practice that is better because it is based on better evidence, for instance – requires that there are structures and processes in place, let’s call them “accountability systems”. So – as well as not neglecting those - when people are trying to “liberate the data”, it’s important that they also think about how the data might best be used and whether that might make a difference to what data is liberated and how. I expect that the AidInfo initiative is doing this, and would be interested to know more.

3) I guess this is related to 1 and to 2 and at the moment I won’t say much about it, but it’s important to understand the political economy of data (including how the workings of accountability link to the generation/circulation/use of data). That is, to get your head round the system of data flows and to contribute to making it work better, you need to understand the political economy and the power dynamics of the production, distribution and consumption of data. It ain’t – despite the pretense of those who talk about evidence-based (rather than informed) policy - a politics free or value free system; to understand it – and change it – requires a clear recognition of that. If information/evidence/data is “the currency of accountability“, then a political economy perspective ought to have considerable value.

Ooops, sounding like a marxist again

PS: I am coining a new term. Bloggybacking. Currently with only one google hit in the whole googlyverse. Promoting one’s own blog on the back of someone else’s better known efforts. Thanks Owen. And others!

My thinking on this has been stimulated by David Roodman of the Center for Global Development. David is in the process of writing a book about micro-finance and posed a question about definitions of development.

That reminded me of a piece of work I led for the Gates Foundation on “Exploring ‘development success’: Indicators, stories and contributing factors” and the train of thought that that rather frustrating piece of work – we were too quick to go along with the client’s slightly confused request (such are the delights of consultancy) – stimulated. David’s thought-provoking post and my comment is here, but the thrust my comment was:

***

I agree that making explicit one’s conception of development, and assessing interventions with the help of a theory which sets out how one might expect to move towards that conception of development is useful and doesn’t happen as much as it should in international development.

That setting out one’s theory – surely one of the foundations for anything pretending to be social science or anything with aspirations to being part of evidence-informed policy – doesn’t happen as a matter of course is, I would suggest, a large part of the reason why we (folks who work in international development) don’t really know what we’re doing, and are making little progress towards having a better idea. And that, along with a lack of accountability, is a large part of why what we do often doesn’t deliver the results that are hoped for.

I guess what I’m saying is that while your insight shouldn’t be that novel, I’m afraid that it is, and am keen to join forces to push its implications! I might start asking “what’s the theory?” (and “where’s the evidence?” and “who’s accountable?) 100 times per week, including of myself.

That you need to ask “are there other useful definitions of development” should give us all pause for thought, particularly those of us who work/have worked at places such as the Center for Global DEVELOPMENT and the Overseas DEVELOPMENT Institute.***

Since posting that response I’ve been thinking some more about the probability that without a theory of what it is you’re trying to do, it will be very difficult – and perhaps impossible – to make an evidence-based assessment of whether you’re succeeding, or to have effective accountability.

I’ve also remembered that I wrote about this nearly 10 years ago, in a report for the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee where I talked – drawing on analysis by David Booth, Howard White and the National Audit Office – about the  ”the missing middle” in DFID’s Country Strategy Papers which “state clearly DFID’s poverty reduction objectives and DFID’s planned spending, but lack analysis of the causes of poverty and strategies to break into these causal relationships.” Saying that there is a “missing middle” was a polite way of saying “you don’t know what you’re doing”.

Will I still be writing about this in another ten years’ time. Please no.

First, a piece from 24th February examining why Ethiopia still needs large quantities of aid to prevent regular famines. This piece is 8 minutes into the programme and includes an interview with the DFID Minister Gareth Thomas.

Second, a piece from 25th February examining the issue of land-leasing in Ethiopia. This piece is 33 minutes into the programme.

Third, a piece from 26th February examining Ethiopia’s record on human rights and democracy. This piece is 32 minutes into the programme and includes an interview with the Head of DFID Ethiopia, Howard Taylor – my boss’s boss and Berhanu Kebede, the Ethiopian Ambassador to the UK.